609
c 571

[For information on the Bedouin concept of laf in which a stranger group, sometimes of "client tribe" origin, attaches itself to the dominant clan in an area, and through some fiction, myth or fraud grafts their branch of descent on to the genealogical tree of this clan, see Categories 608 and 619.]

571 Libyan Bedouin MT9
632

[For information on the role of the Arab "elite," groups of townsmen from Banghazi and Darna of mixed ethnic backgrounds, who functioned as administrators under Italian rule, see Category 563.]

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a
*613
[178] de-emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
[186] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[571] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
121 between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
*613
571 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close participation of members in the social relations of the larger society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that,
in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the
sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Consequently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went,
648 especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
● 571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of
maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

175 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins
114 are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture
619

747 177 433 this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-27).

[474] F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the mintaqa) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on their property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify 747 177 474 426 for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local cooperative society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a [571] complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
•571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an
Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course,
could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves
registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
•571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense,
rather than with respect to his being a member of a group
which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has
been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of
al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where
a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar-
423 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land
use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it
becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare
Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
619
597 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi
genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram,
[114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is
difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other
cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in
[171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern
culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group.
*613 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the
•571 individual and effectively define a range of social choices
for him. The individual's social relations and social roles
are relative to the rights and obligations of the people
related to him through his father. In a sense, the social
world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group
and its network of relationships with other similar groups;
he would not think of leaving this group of his own free
will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe
[181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e.,
[829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to
the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the
desert even after his education as a merchant, a government
clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

*613 the result of the patrilineal principle even though it is
571 by far the most ideologically significant. Other principles
lend structure to associative relationships which may or may not complement those established by the unilinear rule. It is the operation of these other principles which give complexity to the social and political organization of al-Qasr. They may be identified in terms of residence, cognation and social compacts, or the establishment of contractual relations above and beyond those defined by patrilineality. The force of these four structural principles constitute the range or the structural constraints within which individuals and groups in al-Qasr conduct their social relations. Specifically, we
*613 are not interested in all social relations. The main interest
571 here is in those relationships in which individuals or groups
121 struggle for control, or attempt to exercise power. Our
interest is, then, the political aspect of social relations or, what Max Weber discussed in terms of, power and established authority (Bendix 1962:290-297).

*613 It is necessary to discuss the lineage system in al-
[121] Qasr because in a segmentary society, kinship and politics
are analytical aspects of the same process. In the political structure of al-Qasr, we note first of all that the tertiary and secondary segments (see Figure 7 below) are the functionally significant units. Bait 'Umar, the tertiary segment diagramed in Figure 8 below, is typical: it is an autonomous political unit with a discernible authority structure and

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this
level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in
fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of
marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure
is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] *par excellence*." But, as we shall see later, father's
brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than
it is a social reality in al-Qasr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
•571 an external system of authority relations including all who
claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada.
The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural
demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political
action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related
to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent"
and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
121 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
*613
554 systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate
571 authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use
the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the
internal system of political relations and the external system

121 *613 554 571 of political relations. The structural differentiation between them relates to certain specifics of role differentiation and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

*613 619 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1], [See p. 77--Analyst]

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
[121]

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
•571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group
differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent
concrete authority structures, or political groups. This
follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or
what we call political structures, most often deal with the
exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power
relations do occur and when present complicate the situation.
In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the
principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups
which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political
structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political
action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority
(Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted
the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
*613 authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
173
571

*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
●571 does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it
also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may
be properly interpreted as property relations between groups.
Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an
essential premise upon which the social and political order
rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are
separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the
correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity
is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79)
in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the
interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity"
and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how
they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1] [See p. 66--Analyst]

619 *613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. The [171] Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type [114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

*613 Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless 571 society; they have no centralized political institution. The [642] lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

*613 situation or another (Middleton and Tait 1958:11). The most
•571 effective approach to understanding the segmentary society,
121 in view of this dynamic situation, is to isolate the function-
*613 ally significant unit and to analyze its social and political
571 relations (Fortes 1945). This is what I attempted to do in my study of the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr.

*613 In al-Qasr, the secondary segment, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is the basic unit of the social structure. This statement must be qualified seeing that this unit consists of a balanced opposition of smaller tertiary segments, and action at the secondary level is a resultant of political consensus at the tertiary level. However, the ties which emerge from descent, residence, marriage, and contract are highly moral and utilitarian ones; with reference to tribal politics, we can state that corporate action is consensual and most functional at the secondary segment level. We may consider this group, in terms of two levels of corporateness, the basic unit of 'Aishaibat political structure.

*613 All of the segmentary groups of the 'Aishaibat are
619 bound together by the same patrilineal principle; they all trace descent to 'Ali the son of Sa'ada. This principle also links them to the "noble tribes" of Cyrenaica who claim descent from this same ancestress. This principle is the genealogical and ideological basis of a man's claiming to be "Sa'adi," or "Awlad 'Ali," or "Aishaibi," etc. In theory,

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

121 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful
*613 to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating
•571 in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems best to designate this type of authority as being something distinct from political authority. We will call this type of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political group because it is structurally identified with a corporate office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end
[128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 Structural principles designed to promote integration
571 in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and
181 conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in society have interests and values which they seek to maximize in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

121 uals and groups. Radcliffe-Brown (1952:199) spoke of social
571 relations existing where there was "some adjustment of
181 respective interests, by convergence of interest, or by limitation of conflicts that might arise from divergence of interests." When a person or group has an interest in an object, material or immaterial, that object has a certain value for the person or group. Thus does the study of social structure become, for Radcliffe-Brown, "the study of interests and values as the determinants of social relations." Convergence of interests side by side with a divergence of interests characterizes any society, and all societies are segmented on one basis or
121 another. I have found it enlightening to consider the seg-
571 ments of al-Qasr Bedouin society as "interest groups." Interest groups are the real groups which one can observe in either integration or conflict. They are real in the sense that their behavior can be observed. They are real in that they can be defined by a stable pattern of authority relations whereas other groups are non-existent in this sense. The tertiary group and the secondary group, in so far as it is a coordination of replicate corporate groups, are real groups in al-Qasr whereas the primary and tribal levels are theoretical or quasi-groups. That is, they are only potentially interest groups, seeing that, for the time being, they lack the common interests and coordinated activity to be classified as an authority, or political, or interest group.

Familial Authority and Rights and Duties in Kin Relations

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The analysis of authority structure, whether it has reference to a group as small as the family or as large as the nation, assumes as its unit of study the social position or the role. The role is the organized complex of rights and duties by which individuals, or categories of individuals, participate in an interactive process. Roles are linked together into a set, or a structure, by the rights which incumbents claim and the duties they fulfill (Linton 1936:113; Parsons and Shils 1951:23; Gluckman 1963:185). The heuristic value of role analysis is well established. Role theory has been referred to as "the highest level of generalization about social phenomena that has yet become in any sense operational (Southall 1959:17).

Since all social roles possess rights and duties just because they are defined with respect to other roles, we may assume that each and every social role has an authoritative aspect to it. The authoritative aspect of roles refers to the way in which authority positions relate in order to give form to an authority structure. We want to know how the authority positions at all levels of the authority structure function, but for the time being we are concerned with familial authority relations. Until we understand the operation of authority at the familial level, which is the source of legitimate political authority in a kin-based

121 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
571
554 internal and external systems of political relations.

577 As a result of the socialization process, and through
181 relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain
standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household
[596] head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 The value placed upon social order, and the structural
571 mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
181 residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[671] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

577 571 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority
181 relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic
182 than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo
[192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded
[561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

582 [584] she could marry no man.

Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage
582 578 as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes
nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings
between two men they will place claims upon each other's
sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever
marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to
marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The
[182] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis
● [571] for social relationships between groups, regardless of any
[586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins
say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if
he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then,
that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins
will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making
and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to
[182] maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his
father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is
only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her.
582 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the fol-
578 lowing informant's story indicates.
159

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
585 606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
•571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] [782] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
*[613] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
585 principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
*613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

182 *613 551 •571 [585] marker).

In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as ummi ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

*613 604 [182] Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines.

FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX

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*613
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•571


WIFE FROM KAMAILAT TRIBE
ABD AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM QINAISHAT TRIBE
YUNIS ABD AL-MALIK AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL ABD AL-MALIK AL-QINAISHIYYA

604
182 The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief political value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid conflict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

[181]
[867]
[865]

The Corporate Group

121 Two key concepts have derived from Radcliffe-Brown's
602 (1952:32-49) notion of kinship as a reflection of juridicial
*613 relations. Fallers (1956:14), discussing the expression of these concepts in segmentary societies, refers to them as "the lineage principle and its corollary, the corporate lineage group." For Radcliffe-Brown, kinship organization represented social order and this was the basis of societal survival: a social system in order to survive must conform
121 to certain conditions. Adaptive mechanisms, expressed through
602 the institutions of a society, consist of a "network of re-
●571 lations between individuals and groups" (1952:43). These social relations represent a collection of rights and implied duties which reside either with an individual or a group. Though reference is made to the place of the individual in society, the idea of the group is central in the theory of Radcliffe-Brown.

121 Most important is the group referred to as "corporation:"
602 a collectivity of individuals "who jointly exercise some right
571 or rights," and who share common interests deriving from resi-
621 dence and kinship (1952:45). The corporation has rights in rem over its members; thus, the group imposes certain duties and obligations on other persons with respect to the rights of a particular person who is a member of the corporation. The law of blood-revenge is seen by Radcliffe-Brown to bring out

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this aspect of the corporation clearly.

The concept of the corporation as a sociological construct was first used by Maine (1904). The concept was a central one in the work of Max Weber (1947; 1954). As it was used by Maine, and later by Radcliffe-Brown, the corporation as a collection of rights and duties functioned primarily to maintain struetural continuity in society. Weber was concerned mainly with the political aspects of the corporation; this follows from his theoretical and empirical focus on political action and the exercise of authority. The two main elements of the corporate group as a social relationship according to Weber are that it is limited and defined by rules of admission, and that the administration of the group is carried out by functionaries, incumbents of political roles. An explicit structure of authority is the key to Weber's concept of corporate group: "Whether or not a corporate group exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority, with or without an administration staff" (1947: 145-146). Weber did differentiate analytically the corporate group from the other concept, first defined by Maine (1907: 108-110), the "Corporation sole" or "Public officer." However, he insisted that one could not exist without the other. Any analysis of the structure of authority in society must focus on both of these concepts.

The conditions for the formation of a corporate group

121 are, as Radcliffe-Brown correctly stated, the existence of
602 kinship ties and common residence. But, as Weber noted, the
•571 expression of corporation is absent without a structure of
621 authority. The corporate authority structure functions to allot group membership and political status; to formulate and enforce a rule of succession governing the transmission of property and roles; and to define and assign rights and duties of group members toward others. Group rights over members, as rights in rem, produce mutual rights for members which entitle them to protection against external enemies. Hence the corporate group is characterized by internal functions which define and control relationships between members, and external functions which identify the group within a given structural context where it has jurisdiction and governs its relations with other elements in this environment. Within this context, the corporate group is representative of any individual member. Both the internal and external functional aspects of the corporate group operate through the office of a specialized role whose incumbent has authoritative and representative powers. This is the role, or office, which Maine referred to as the "Corporation sole," and which Weber later called the Leiter ("chief").

*613 In al-Qasr, the corporate lineage group is composed
621 of agnates who reside together in a mintaqa, and who accept
571 as legitimate and morally binding an explicit process of

*613 decision-making which allocates values in society. This
621 process orders the internal and external political relations
•571 of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate sole (Smith 1966).

621 The corporate group, although based on common interests
626 and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of
571 consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships.
[183] Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951: 161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity. Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integra-
621 tion. The corporate group and its authority structure is the
571 mechanism which insures, through political means, the neces-
182 sary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr
[121] society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 571 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
182 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin politi-
121 cal system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the
differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity, the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community" (Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

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> a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . .; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action,
181 and social order to a central traditional value which promotes
621 group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a
571 value [illegible]es not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition
191 preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives
from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the hayy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the hayy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . ." (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 571 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
171 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
revenge." And it is important to note that the *hayy* was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights *in rem*
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 675 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
608 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
597 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
[602] noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (*katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya*). The integration
or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

121 621 571 675 608 597 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected, patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing the jointure.

621 571 *613 The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin society is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila, in al-Qasr, is the head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or bait. A [884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man 621 571 *613 672 [682] acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-money" - diiya) of each other, and are under obligation to contribute equal shares to any diiya which becomes due from the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the oath (yamiin) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an 'aqila.

*613 The tertiary bait is the minimal corporate group. It usually includes three to five generations of members. Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate group, the secondary unit or 'aiela. Beyond the secondary level

*613 (Schacht 1953:207).

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682 So, in pre-Islamic Arabia and later, the _'aqila_ and not the culprit was responsible for payment of the _diya_ or for retaliation. And the _'aqila_, which means every single corporate member, risked its life in the face of retaliation from without. According to Islamic law, only the killer may be retaliated upon. But in pre-Islamic Arabia and in al-Qasr, any member of the killer's corporate group may be revenged upon. The Bedouins say that revenge should be taken upon the best man of the family, for this will cause the most damage. Both the legal schools of Madina (Maliki) and Kufa recognized the principle of self-help, or collective responsibility, for payment or retaliation in cases of homicide and wounding. And, according to Coulson (1964:49), "they both called the group which shoulders the burden the _'aqila_."

*613 The _'aqila_ in al-Qasr, which is an uncentralized system, is a corporate sole and a political office. It functions both in internal domestic (i.e. within the tertiary segment) authority relations, and at the level of external authority relations. The _'aqila_ is a symbol of his corporation and, as such, speaks for its members in matters of social regulation and the enforcement of political decisions growing out of conflict situations. Political order in al-Qasr depends

[591] upon the values inculcated and the type of authority exercised within the corporate group (Southall 1956:27). The model of

571 *613 [593] [604] The model of corporate authority structure, i.e., that which makes the corporation-corporate sole relationship meaningful, is the father-son-father's brother triad. The submission of the son in the fundamental dyadic and triadic relationships of Bedouin society is carried over to the, just as axiomatic, relationship between corporate member and corporate sole. Peters (1965:127) is enlightening on this point when he says

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> All men of a Corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

The structure of authority relations which obtains within and between the groups of al-Qasr, then, is reflected in the idea or concept of _'aqila_. It is meaningful to the Bedouins. The social order which it represents is legitimate because of the moral attribute and obligation which attaches to its symbolization in the political office. At the same time, this focus or office of authority tends to become pivotal for the extension of a sphere of moral judgments and authority relations along with the expansion of social structural relations and promotion of common interests. Easton (1959) has referred to this expansion as "the political community," and Middleton and Tait (1958) as "the jural community." At all levels of society, conflict and consensus take place in terms of certain ideas concerning good and bad, operational

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
•571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
578 structure in the role of *'aqila* relates to the high value which
577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr
*[613] are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many different groups in differing degrees of importance, all quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the good" (*tariiq al-khair*). Mainly, this involves helping others to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together" when they are in conflict. When two individuals quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
*[613] brings *'aib* ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals
quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings *'ar* ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the
[626] individuals (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
[784] in the ways which cause *'aib* to himself, or *'ar* to his group,

181 578 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
577 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
626 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
784 regulation.

*613 The role of 'aqila presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
*•571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society," and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective 'aqila. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the 'aqila. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 the central value and traditional institution of 'aqila which
•571 has always existed and is still binding. All authority is
182 referable in some way and in varying degrees to the office of
'aqila which alone represents "the legitimate exercise of
imperative control" (Weber 1947:153). Because private interests
clash with the duties and obligations of social roles and corporate
interests, political action, or the exercise of authority
and the regulation of conflict, may be assigned to levels of
128 the social structure and analyzed in this way. In this chapter
we have discussed the social structure of al-Qasr, and have
touched on what gives structure and meaning to political
action. We have seen that the structure of authority operating
through the office of 'aqila deals with both an internal and
an external system of political relations, a corporate group
and a societal unit. The purpose of the following discussion
will be to make clear some of the abstractions and concepts
used here in outlinging structure and authority in Bedouin
society.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

*613 The role of _'aqila_ is the single specialized role in
554 Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to
[596] differentiate another authority role, that of the _shaib_
(elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The _'aqila_ represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

*613 The role of _'aqila_ is instituted at the tertiary
554 structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each
•571 tertiary _bait_ has its own _'aqila_. But, in fact, not every
tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political
[128] structure of the lineage. In the next section, we will draw
a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The _'aqila_ acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other _'awaaqil_ (plural of
554 _'aqila_) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
•571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of _'aqila_ is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

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578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
•571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The **'aqila** regulates conflict between the members of his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The _'aqila_ may pre-empt the authority
578 of the _shaib_ in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554
[596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-
*613 discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the _'aqila_, and of all the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval of his _'awaaqil_.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the _lex talionis_, it was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 Each member of the corporate group contributes an
682 equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case.
435 The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at
436 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels.
178 [571] If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his
share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market
prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in
[231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance
of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there
[556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel
owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least
1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge
682 as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the 'aqila
554 must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money.
571 Each 'aqila of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The _'aqila_ must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the _'aqila_ "should be rich." Though the _'awaaqil_ of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an _'aqila_: "The _'aqila_ is responsible for his _bait_.

*613 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
• 571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course
[692] of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

> 691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
> 692 (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh
> *613 because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
> 554 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would
> 629 choose the third party, and the judgment would be binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E. and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E. fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his 'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
•571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

*613 554 ●571 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the permission and approval of the *'aqila* are required. Or, I should say, the approval of the *'awaaqil* is required, for both cases represent structural changes which affect the juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corporation. The legitimacy of the *'aqila* and the whole political structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301) says, and hence the legitimacy of the *'aqila* in al-Qasr flows from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an authority role. An *'aqila* once told me that "the tribe of the *'aqila* gives him the authority to judge between its members." Another *'aqila* said that "the *'awaaqil* are bound [675] by a contract (*rawaabit*) to perform their duty on behalf of their *bait*." The *rawaabit* ("bonds") we will discuss in the next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

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Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (*Herrschaft*); that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

121 content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1947:152). In the next chapter, it will be useful to distinguish between the concept of authority and that of "power." Mainly, we are concerned here with the legitimate exercise of authority in the regulation of conflict involving members of an "imperatively coordinated group" (1947:153), or corporation, at both the internal and external levels of the Bedouin political system.

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It has already been stated in the last chapter that political action occurs at all levels of the social structure; it is not peculiar to the external relational system. The tendency to differentiate structurally between "domestic relations" and "political relations" began with Evans-Pritchard (1940:148) who analyzed the Nuer political system as "an expanding series of opposed segments from the relations within the smallest tribal section to intertribal and foreign relations." This definition could serve as a description of the political system of the Bedouins of al-Qasr, or of any other segmentary society. Fortes (1949; 1953:26) first used the terms "domestic relations" and "political relations." He arbitrarily limited political action to the lineage structure, and assigned "person-to-person relations" to the sphere of kinship or domestic organization. Southall (1953), who applied the ideas of Max Weber, isolated what he referred to as two different types of authority: the "familial" and

121 114 *613 •571 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need, however, to relegate the political to any particular social area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155). Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to [554] persist. The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is expressed through two structures: an authority role and authority groups, the _'aqila_ and the tertiary segments, the corporate sole and corporate groups.

The analysis which follows considers society as a 121 554 composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles are the basic elements of social structures which "order the human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for extending role analysis. For the most part, political action in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

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Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the _'aqila_ as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

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*[613]
Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as _'aqila_. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

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In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin _'aqila_ shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (_shaib_). The _shaib_, as senior agnate of his _naja'_, is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary corporate group. A _shaib_, by virtue of his age, is supposed to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
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600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 578 593 [604] Theoretically, as one _'aqila_ said, conflict should be stopped at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal uncle, and should never reach the level of the _'aqila_. Once before the _'aqila_, conflict assumes new structural poses, or different orientation in authority relations. Authority here is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this level the father _per se_ cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 578 182 The _'aqila_, who is responsible for internal order and external relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the political structure. The authority of the _'aqila_ is checked and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single _'aqila_ must consult with the other _'awaaqil_ of the secondary segment concerning matters which may concern the structural nature and continuity of the group.

*613 559 •571 171 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above) of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But [596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

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554 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the ●571 shaib and the 'aqila. The incumbents of the two roles may 171 have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary 596 segment, but they will never have the same social status. There are as many elders as there are households, but there is only one 'aqila for each group. Another difference between the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not occur above the familial (i.e. shaib) level.

*613 The difference between the shaib and the 'aqila is 554 the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social 596 control. The shaib acts in accordance with the values implied by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the 'aqila is legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority structure. These two spheres of political action represent familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level. 629 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance 596 are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For in- 685 stance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's chicken. No one sent for the 'aqila. They sent for the shaib of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

627 596 685 *[613] from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the next step would have been to inform the appropriate _'aqila_ to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to bear.

*613 ● 571 682 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sole. Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins, as an _'aqila_. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is referred to as _'umraa al-dam_ ("donator of blood"), or _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which [681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according to _lex talionis_, or if blood-money as compensation for the loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This group, when it functions as _waliiy al-dam_ ("executor of a blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that the guilty party be punished by his _'aqila_. When this group pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

*613 •571 682 the conversion of small authority groups into larger ones. Political order depends upon this convergence of principles and the affirmation of the values and institutions which the [182] principles imply. In turn, the resulting political organization helps to maintain the "body of interconnected moral and legal norms" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20).

When blood-money is paid out, all of the tertiary groups contribute an equal share. When blood-money is received, the group of the killed man receives one-half of the diiya and the remainder is divided equally among the members of the secondary group. The distribution of blood-money was explained as follows:

> The one-half of the diiya which goes to the murdered man's bait belongs to his sons. If the man was not married and had no sons, then the money goes to his brothers or those closely related to him (bi-dam), like his uncles or paternal cousins. If the man was married and had only daughters, and they had no brothers, these females can claim the diiya only if they are married to someone in the tribe. (Here the word tribe refers to the secondary lineage group.) If they are married to someone from outside the tribe, the female will take no money because her husband will not contribute to the next diiya in the tribe.

This is the ideal situation. But blood-money distribution is relative to the level at which conflict takes place, i.e., depending upon the nature of the relationship between the authority groups concerned. For instance, it means a great deal if the groups concerned are of the same secondary segment.

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In 1947, party A of Bait 'Umar, 'Ailit Ma'fas accidentally shot party B of Bait Muhammad, 'Ailit Ma'fas. Since both parties were of the same family, 'awaaqil from 'Ailit Lazumi, a third party, were called to adjudicate. The 'awaaqil decided that a diiya of 400 L.E. should be paid to Bait Muhammad. Of the 400 L.E. diiya, Bait 'Umar was to pay 200 L.E. and the rest of the secondary group, with the exception of Bait Muhammad, was to pay 200 L.E. The brother of the killed man said that they would accept the 200 L.E. from Bait 'Umar, but would take only 100 L.E. from the rest of the family. The 300 L.E. diiya then went to the brothers of the killed man who had no sons and whose father was deceased. The diiya was paid in one week's time.

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Although I have tended to use the terms tertiary segment and corporate group interchangeably, the two are not structurally synonymous. Not every tertiary segment is a corporate group or authority group. Just as tertiary corporate groups combine into larger secondary corporate groups so do tertiary groups which lack size and property, i.e., political power, ally themselves together under one 'aqila to form corporate authority groups. Subsumed under the secondary segmental heading of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) are eleven structurally separate tertiary segments, but the corporate authority structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas includes only five groups. Thus there are only five politically significant authority groups, or 'awaaqil, which represent 'Ailit Ma'fas to the outside world. Six of the tertiary segments are numerically small enough that they have found it politically advantageous to consolidate "in sharing the good and the bad." The combination of tertiary segments into authority groups is as follows:

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Authority Group		Components	No. of Persons	Total Persons
I.	Bait 'Umar	Bait 'Umar	73	73
II.	Bait Kailani	Bait Kailani	67	67
III.	Bait Firjani	Bait Firjani	31	43
		Bait Salih	12	
IV.	Bait Muhammad	Bait Muhammad	27	30
		Bait Yunis	3	
V.	Bait Braik	Bait Braik	6	32
		Bait Abd al-Hadi	6	
		Bait Fadl	3	
		Bait Mahaishi	8	
		Bait Maraja	9	
			245	245

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These five groups represent the political structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Authority relations between the 245 members, and between the five groups, proceed with reference to the five _'awaaqil_ of the secondary group. External relations of 'Ailit Ma'fas, either in the form of demanding rights from other secondary segments, or of meeting obligations toward these groups, proceed through the five _'awaaqil_ "speaking with one voice." One group in 'Ailit Ma'fas, Bait Musa, migrated to the Nile Valley sometime during the 1930's. Bait Musa no longer possesses jural rights or obligations in the lineage. But jural relations are not always severed as a result of moving. 'Ailit Shraif, another secondary group in al-Qasr, has one _bait_ in the Nile Valley which maintains its

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•571 jural status in the lineage by contributing its share of the blood-money.

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178 The consolidation of tertiary groups into authority groups may shed some light on the dual process of fission and fusion common in segmentary societies. The structure of authority groups which make up a secondary group is a reflection of the way in which tertiary segments grow and segment, or decline and fuse, into other groups. In the process, one group, or many small groups of agnates, are incorporated under a name other than that of their genealogical ancestor. Through time, and in the interest of group solidarity and political order, real biological ties may be obscured: the regulation of political relations favors ideological jural ties over genealogical ties which indicate lineal differences. With reference to 'Ailit Ma'fas, perhaps in the future, Bait Yunis, with only three members, will be totally submerged into the authority group, Bait Muhammad, so that the individual, Yunis, will be dropped from the genealogy of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Then the descendents of Yunis will be linked to Muhammad, the founder of Bait Muhammad, by an artificial link, though the patrilineal ideology will define it as a descent link. During the period of solidification, there is apt to be confusion concerning the exact nature of kinship ties. For instance, in al-Qasr, there was a great deal of argument about whether or not 'Ailit Ma'fas was once a segment of 'Ailit Lazumi. As I

*613 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed
•571 over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is
178 unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission
and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another
instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal
ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed
in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations.
We shall see below how secession and adoption actually
function in Bedouin society.

*613 We have said that the authority of the 'aqila is
675 legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr
554 often legitimate the authority of the 'aqila in writing, and,
571 at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact
which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate
group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest
which defines expectations and consequences for corporate
members: it governs the conduct of members in situations
relevant to internal order, and gives the 'aqila powers
of representation in external affairs. The charter is a
[181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security
and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider
*613 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social
675 relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to
571 quote him extensively here.

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> The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in a social relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims which the parties concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners . . . The more rational in relation to values or to given ends the action is, the more is this likely to be the case . . . The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent. This implies that the parties make promises covering their future behavior, whether toward each other or toward third persons. In such cases each party then normally counts, so far as he acts rationally, in some degree on the fact that the other will orient his action to the meaning of the agreement as he (the first actor) understands it . . . But in part also they are motivated each by the value to him of his "duty" to adhere to the agreement in the sense in which he understands it.

The idea of "duty" makes collective responsibility meaningful, and the authority of "the third party," or 'aqila, legitimate.

The ties which bind the corporate group may be defined in terms of the structural principles of kinship and residence. But these ties must be affirmed and further defined by contractual obligations which inform an authority structure. Further, the legitimacy of authority relations beyond the tertiary level is based mainly upon contractual alliance. The relationship between contract and the other structural principles is a mutually reinforcing one. Kinship and residence alone cannot be the basis for the existence of a corporate group. The Bedouins of the Western Desert in their statements of contractual alliance not only proclaim the conditions for brotherhood, but, also, the consequences for those who do not meet these conditions. A Bedouin, or a whole corporate tertiary

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segment, may choose to belong to, or to secede from, the larger corporate group. This element of choice helps to define the authority of the corporate sole. Authority is illegitimate, i.e. it is mere power, when control is exercised against the will of the subjects (Weber 1947).

Above, I have said that authority is legitimated beyond the tertiary level, i.e., at the secondary level, through contractual alliance. By that I mean the same agreement on values is replicated by the authority groups of the lineage. The five authority groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas are bound together by what the Bedouins call "the bonds of the _'awaaqil"_ (_rawaabit al-'awaaqil_). Below I present a number of examples of the _rawaabit_ from al-Qasr. Then I continue on to show the nature of the corporate group, and the dynamics of structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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BONDS BETWEEN THE 'AWAAQIL OF 'AILIT MA'FAS

1. Every member of the tribe who has proved against him an intrigue concerning the _'aiela_,
2. every member of the tribe who claims against his brother a case which has no basis,
3. every member of the tribe who shifts a border of the borders of a land from one place to another place,
4. every _'aqila_ is responsible for his followers and must present each with the right direction if he does not convince him first (i.e. if he fails at moral discourse, he must arrange the court session),
5. every member of the tribe who departs from the opinion of his _'aqila_ and who follows the wrong and erroneous

*613 6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint
675 without first consulting his 'aqila, (i.e. who
•571 goes to the government before the 'aqila),

539 7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of
his bait against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a dhabiiha ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The 'awaaqil (signatures or stamps):
 Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
 Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
 Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
 'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
 Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 In the rawaabit, or contract, just noted the term
619 "tribe" refers to the secondary segment ('aiela). Murray
675 (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins'
*613 use, in a formal document, of the word qabiila ("tribe") when
reference to "some smaller division, such as 'eila is clearly
meant."

675 Through the rawaabit norms are expressed and action
681 is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions
[183] may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The
*[813] minimal sanction which the 'aqila may impose is the dhabiiha

675 ("blood sacrifice") and a fine of 10 L.E. The most serious
681 sanction which the group, through the *'aqila*, can administer
*613 is banishment. In this case, the decision "to wash one's hands of another" may originate with the *'aqila* but must be executed by the next of kin, or the process can originate with the next of kin and be carried out with the approval of the *'awaaqil*. In any case, it is an ultimate negative sanction which ranks with blood-revenge in degree of seriousness, since social and political status is withdrawn from the person. A banished person is no longer protected in accordance with the principle of collective responsibility, and his group may no
675 longer demand blood-money for his life. The charter of 'Ailit
*613 Lazumi presented below is similar in most respects to that of
● 571 'Ailit Ma'fas with the exception that it makes provision for
681 the *barawwa*, the act of banishing from the group. The document was issued in four copies to each of the *'awaaqil* of Lazumi. Note that in both charters thus far shown, not only are the individuals of the group bound by the rules but, also, the *'aqila* comes under the rule of law.

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BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT LAZUMI AL-'AISHAIBAT, (Wednesday, January 19, 1952)

681 In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate

539 In the presence of 'Umran Kailani, Hajj 'Ali, the *'awaaqil* and individuals of Bait Bu Jafaila who signed below, this agreement took place and the *'awaaqil* of this *'aiela* are:

675 1 - Hajj Salah Bu Jafaila, 'aqila of Bait Bu Halaiqa
*613 2 - Kuraim Juhami, 'aqila of Bait Uthman
•571 3 - Ruwaf Jadalla, 'aqila of Bait Jadella
681 4 - Muftah Tahir, 'aqila of Bait Tahir

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Every 'aqila is responsible for his family whether concerning the occurrence of problems, and collecting money from his family, or other matters. Every person who rejects the opinion of the 'aqila, or reports to the government without the consent of the 'aqila will be subjected to a fine of 10 L.E. and a dabiha according to the 'awaiyid. And every person who delays in carrying out the decisions of the 'aqila and all that he indicates will also be subject to the same fine. And also, any one who delays in swearing the oath or in supporting his family, and in so doing loses the interest which belongs to the 'aiela, he will be subject to the same fine. Any of the 'awaaqil who cause the loss of any right of the rights of the members of the 'aiela will also be subject to the same fine. And any member who makes false claims against any of the other members of the 'aiela is subject to the same fine. And any 'aqila or member from the members of the 'aiela who has proven against him an intrigue, or a quarrel, or prejudice between him and his brother or paternal cousin is subject to the same fine. He is also subject to the same fine who has proven against him prejudice in favor of another party against his paternal cousins, that is to say, the members of this 'aiela. And every 'aqila or individual who delays in signing and accepting these bonds, or in executing them, is considered an outsider by this 'aiela and the 'aiela will not be responsible for him in the future, and this will be considered a barawwa for him from the 'aiela.

This was issued in four copies to the 'awaaqil, and all previous bonds are cancelled from this date and are no longer effective.

Signatures and stamps of 'awaaqil and witnesses.

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681 The barawwa (literally: "the act of putting outside") is a formal procedure, formal enough to entail having the process notarized as a legal document according to Egyptian civil law. The Bedouins say that the legal document of barawwa is "to show that we have washed our hands of the

675 culprit, and are no longer responsible for his acts." The
681 *barawwa* is not only the imposition of a most severe sanction
675 by the group, but it is also the withdrawal of all positive
681 sanctions which would apply to an individual as a member of
•571 the group. The withdrawal of sanctions means the withdrawal
of the right of reciprocity; consequently, the banished no
longer comes under the rule of succession, and he has no
[421] rights over either persons or things. The banished may claim
no property of the property of the group other than that which
he takes with him, and he may claim no women from the group.
675 The *barawwa*, naturally enough, is uncommon in al-Qasr. The
681 last occurred in 1957, the declaration of which is reproduced
below.

DECLARATION OF BARAWWA

Law Office of Abd al-Rahman
Marsa Matruh

50 milleme tax
stamp

On this date the following came: Kuraim Juhami of the 'Aishaibat on behalf of himself and his paternal uncle, and their *'umda*, the first party. And there also came Sa'ad Uthman on behalf of himself and his children, the second party. The reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the *barawwa* from each other. Since they have all agreed by their own will without any force or ill feeling that the two parties shall not be responsible for each other's actions, it is a valid agreement that can never be rejected. No one from either of the parties is responsible to the other in supporting oaths, in paying for wounds, or in paying blood-revenge (*diya*), and no one from either party involved in *barawwa* will take girls from the other. This *barawwa* became a dividing line between the two parties, and if later there appears a fraternity paper, the *barawwa* will be cancelled and be to no avail. This paper is signed

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681 by us and by the below mentioned witnesses to be used when it is necessary. This barawwa was issued in two copies at the hand of each of the two parties to be used in time of necessity.

Approving what is included, the first party, Kuraim Juhami (stamp)	Approving what is included the second party Sa'ad Uthman (stamp)

Witness to this:
Abd al-Rahman, the lawyer
Date: September 24, 1957

STAMP OF MINISTRY OF WAR
BORDER GUARDS
MATRUH SECTOR

Signatures or stamps of eight witnesses.

1 - Copy to Marsa Matruh Police Station
2 - Copy at the hand of the first party
3 - Copy at the hand of the second party

Seen and the original must be kept in the files of the administration of complaints, and a copy must be delivered to each of the two parties.

Signed: Colonel Ahmad Sa'ad
Marsa Matruh Police Station

Date: October 12, 1957

*613 The rawaabit in Bedouin society is essentially a
675 charter at the tertiary level, but it structures relations
•571 at the secondary level. At the tertiary level, the charter
functions to establish group boundaries and identity, and to
*613 express the conditions for membership. Group solidarity and
571 maintenance at the tertiary level is a necessary condition
for structural continuity of the larger secondary corporation:
the lineage persists through these groups with replicate
060 functions, structures, and a common ancestor. That the

*613 173 That the secondary segment is as significant as the tertiary group seems to be indicated by the Bedouin tendency to mythologize the founder of the secondary group. For instance, Ma'fas is a nickname literally meaning "the big-footed one;" the Zagharat take their name from a man who used the zaghaariid ("shrill cry of joy" used by women) as his battle-cry; Abu Qarasa means "father of bread-loaf;" Sayyid Shraif was a very "noble" (shraif - "high-bred, noble") man. Along with each name there are a number of different myths to explain it: hence Ma'fas was a cattle thief who left large footprints in the mud so that all would know of his daring exploits; Abu Qarasa baked hugh loaves of bread to honor his in-laws when they visited him. On the other hand, there are no myths about

*613 178 founders of tertiary segments. Tertiary segments might, in the future, disappear from the Bedouins' genealogy, either because of death, barawwa, or secession, but the secondary group survives these events. It is the secondary segment, as we shall see in our discussion of law and sanctions, which is structurally important for the political community of the Awlad 'Ali.

*613 • 571 Because the secondary level is the more structurally important, seeing that the greater benefits of collective responsibility derive from it, the tertiary group surrenders part of its autonomy to it. The tertiary group does so in just the way that the individual member of any polity allows

*613 public obligations to temper private interests. This temper-
*613 ing process in Bedouin society is effected through the agree-
● 571 ment, or bonds, between the 'awaaqil of the secondary group
675 as representatives of the members of the tertiary groups.
The 'aqila and the members of a tertiary group submit to
structural arrangements of organization and procedure at
the secondary level of interest and authority. All this is
symbolized in the duplicate copies of the rawaabit and the
name of the "famous" ancestor.

*613 I do not underestimate the importance of the tertiary
571 segment. I realize that internal order at this level is what
prevents anarchy at the secondary level. And I do not mean
to imply that integration is necessarily any greater at the
tertiary level than at the secondary level--it may or it may
*613 not be the case. Conflict is more difficult to detect at the
571 tertiary level than at the secondary level due to the practical
578 value which the Bedouins place upon stable relations between
brothers and immediate relatives. But conflict does take
place, and the Bedouins do attempt to regulate it at this
level.

*613 The Bedouins say that blood-revenge and the feud
682 cannot possibly operate at the tertiary level. On the other
hand, homicide does occur "between brothers." We have already
described the case of manslaughter in 'Ailit Ma'fas and the
manner in which it was dealt with: no retaliation would have

*613 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental.
682 In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary
units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the
*613 case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit
682 Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates
•571 the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary
segment, and the degree to which authority relations are
manageable without a resulting structural change.

> *613 In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took
> 682 place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed
> 571 that they would be collectively responsible for each
> other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact.
> 675 The compacts involved the sharing of diiya and kubaara
> (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and
> Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was
> that the 'awaaqil ordered Bait A to pay a kubaara of
> 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A,
> decided to pay 10 L.E. of the kubaara and Bait A paid
> the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing
> of the kubaara saying that Bait B is a third brother
> and, as such, should act as a quwaal al-kahair ("a
> speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides
> against the others. As a result of this incident, the
> split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper.
> Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the
> diiya involving members of the other group even if it
> concerned external conflict with other secondary groups.
> This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960
> when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the
> killing was within the same contractual alliance. At
> this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its
> differences and, all together, paid Bait B its diiya.

*613 Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten
578 the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it
[681] happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the
barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent
structural deterioration.

*613 structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break
• 571 authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract
675 new authority relations, are rights of the authority group.
681 This can be noted in the "Declaration of Barawwa" presented
578 earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason
[597] for the coming together of these two parties is in order
to ask the barawwa from each other." Further, mention was
made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects
of the barawwa. So, secession can be a means of regulating
[597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative
move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its
foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary
group.

*613 Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a
571 response to ecological demands, represents a structural
[578] change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure
of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e.,
breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary
group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective
responsibility. This is a most important point. The office
*613 of 'aqila, the Bedouin charters, and the raison d'etre of the
571 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
681 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
675 money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document
belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

*613 of secession, and the nature of the collective responsibility
571 principle in Bedouin society are made clear. The occasion of
681 the writing of this document was the issuance of a "fraternity
675 paper."

BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT ABU QARASA

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Thanks to God alone and nothing survives but His kingdom, praise and peace to Him Who will never have a Prophet who is greater than Himself.

It came into our hands on 10 Shawal 1363 (September 9, 1944), the *'awaaqil* of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat; and the reason for their coming together is in order to merge 'Ailit Abu Qula with the other *buyuut* as they were in the past. And this is in accordance with the agreement of all the parties to this paper. By the free will of all it became, as of this day, that all of the mentioned *buyuut* will be connected with the other *buyuut* in receiving and giving. But all blood-money of the mentioned *buyuut* which was due before the date 3 Shawal 1361, that is to say all debts for past offences, they and their former relatives will be responsible for. After this date, which is 3 Shawal 1361, each of the mentioned *buyuut* will share the good and the bad equally. And the *'awaiyid* which the mentioned *buyuut* agreed upon are the following:

1 - First, he who intentionally beats his brother in the *'aiela* will pay by himself and no one from the *'aiela* will pay anything with him.

2 - But the offense which takes place within the *'aiela*, the fine for it will be distributed in such a way that the first half of the payment will go to the offended *bait* and the second half will be distributed among all of the mentioned *buyuut*.

3 - The offense which happens to the *'aiela* from an outside party, half of the payment goes to the *'aiela* and the second half to the offended *bait*.

*613 •571 681 4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be responsible for himself alone, and his relatives in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for him.

539 675 5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

*613 554 571 [675] Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral and political significance of the secondary group in the Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound authority group entitles one to political status without which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

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[671] The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

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[671] In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

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•571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the 'awaiyid,
628 or law of the Bedouins.
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Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the 'awaaqil who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the rawaabit, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the 'awaiyid. Not all conflict in the
external political system is, in terms of our structural
levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is
any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that
they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest
the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e.
feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less,
and, finally, the government asked us to return to the
'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert."
I was unable to document the claim that the government had
"abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials
who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that
it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
•571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted,
according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an
offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense,
legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to
the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated
with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 578 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
● 571 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
* 613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672 *613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was disagreement
682 among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office,
182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

*613 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man,
682 all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the *diiya*.
681 All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in
182 Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and
•571 retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case:
"The *wergilt* debt as set by the judge was the most ancient
debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it."
[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case:
". . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of
political relations, must be treated in connexion with the
blood-feud." The blood-feud and the *diiya* are institutions by
which authority groups interact and political order is main-
681 tained. Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place
578 and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political
682 system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about
which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide
or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over
rights to land, water, and women which could have led to
violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of
the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 Rules regarding the *diiya* in Bedouin society apply
682 at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important
to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous
authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary
societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

578 *613 682 Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the Dawlat in revenge for the beating. Many 'awaaqil from the [571] [692] tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision of the 'awaaqil was made according to the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. A diiya of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The diiya was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat, and it was paid over the period of three years. The diiya was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the killed man, and the other half went to the 'aiela.

Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land. One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a [571] [692] boy. The 'awaaqil settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a 400 L.E. diiya. In 1959, after all those years, the son and [683] his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

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The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the _diiya_ payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

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Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
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[685] the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money. The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby. The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the *'awaaqil* of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one *'awaaqil* plus 'Umda Ibra-
•571 him. They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682 with them as a *kubaara*. In Libya, they met with officials of
578 the Libyan government and the *'awaaqil* of the Harabi tribe.
682 The Harabi asked for a *diiya* of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and, the murder was connected with in-
*613 tentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
[685] reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

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578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
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•[571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights
according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has consequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
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784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND AUTHORITY

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Political Role Analysis: Theoretical Framework

There is current confusion over the definition and use of concepts in political analysis. Ideas concerning power, influence, authority, and the general notion of leadership itself, are variously treated and dealt with equally well. But in every case, a necessary and common aspect of political studies is that of role analysis.

121 554 571 "Role" is that part of the actor's behavior which constitutes and defines his participation in the social interactive process (Parsons and Shils 1951:23). Political roles define who does what with respect to the political aspect of the social interactive process, i.e. in the system of authority relations. In a most general sense, political role structure may be divided into the two categories of "followers" and "leaders" (Leach 1954:8-10; Easton 1965:205). From the level of the family to the largest social grouping, persons are assigned by the group, or take it upon themselves, to make and help execute decisions. This is to say, that some degree of leadership exists in all social groupings. Whether or not such leadership is institutionalized is another question with which we shall

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554 deal in the course of this discussion.

571 No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

121 I do not consider this point a debatable one, though
171 writings on the subject of political organization in primitive
554 society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable.
571 For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of
American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without
chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront
cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes
that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time
specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and
Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51)
defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is
unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and,
121 above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief." All
554 of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-
time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assign-
ment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

121 or absence of political roles in primitive societies. It is
554 obvious that in no society does an individual play one, and only one, role. Every social role is, in some degree, a part-time role. Even at the apex of role specialization and structural complexity (the presidency of the United States, for instance), an individual plays his political role along with others. Also, in trying to determine the presence or absence of roles in a society, it should be kept in mind that the notion of institutionalization refers to a process and not a state of being. Therefore, in any one society at any one point in time, there may be a number of roles "happening." This, it seems, will especially be the case in the dynamic field of politics.

121 In political analysis, influential and leadership
554 roles may be viewed in terms of differential responsibility.
•571 Authority is the institutionalization of a responsible relationship between the leader and other members of the collectivity wherein the former has the right to expect support from the latter in given situations (Parsons 1960:183-186). A role which is imbued with power, but not authority in the analytical sense which I wish to bring out here, lacks this institutionalized right to expect support. M.G. Smith (1966:127) makes this analytical distinction most clearly:

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> As a regulatory capacity, authority is legitimated and identified by the rules, traditions, and precedents which embody it and which govern its exercise and objects. Power is also regulatory, but is neither fully prescribed nor governed by norms and rules.

Authority is always attached to specific roles while power is a generalized control over others. For instance, power may be based on religious or economic grounds and operate with equal influence in the political sphere. The basis of the legitimacy of authority is the backing which it receives from the legal system. Power, however, is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his will regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152). Power over others is a type of influence which may operate without their consent, their "will," or even their awareness and understanding. For instance, when one party controls property or other values essential to person's existence, he has power over those others (Goldhamer and Shils 1939).

Influence of the authority type is explicit and institutionalized control of certain symbols which emphasizes group goals. Power-type influence is the control of goods and symbols, often the inexplicit manipulation of these things, which emphasizes particularistic goals usually with a private individual referent. Power and authority are two types of influence. For analytical purposes, they may be considered at opposite ends of a scale of institutionalization. In this

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way, each may be considered as having aspects of the other attached to it: a power role may at times take on an authoritative aspect, and an authority role, when its incumbent "pulls rank," may be said to be exerting power rather than authority.

I have found it necessary to utilize the concepts and ideas discussed here in order to understand the distribution of power in al-Qasr. The range of authoritative action is wide in Bedouin society, and no simple dichotamy between power and authority will suffice to explain it. However, authority does crystallize at certain points in the al-Qasr social structure, and political rights and duties at these reference points become relatively formal and well-defined. When we speak of the crystallization of authority roles, we refer to a tendency toward legitimacy as a process of institutionalization taking place in society. Authority among the 'Aishaibat tribe is legitimate, public, and representative because it is distributed and exercised with reference to imperatively coordinated associations, or corporate groups.

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Furthermore, the manner in which authority is segmented and distributed informs and legitimates the Bedouin lineage structure. On the other hand, power and power roles possessing no legitimate or representative influence with reference to the lineage structure, may actually inform "structures" and "modes" which combine and "are quite unlike the articulations

121 in a lineage system" (Peters 1967:280).

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571 My own study indicates that authority roles are more
*613 easily studied since they are more easily observable. Power
roles are subtle simply because they are less institutionalized; closer field work is required if we are to understand
their structure and function. Al-Qasr is characterized by
segmentation in communication structure which follows the
lines of lineage segmentation. As a consequence of this,
social intercourse is of a restricted nature wherein each
lineage group tends to be its own audience. In cases such
as these, where social interaction is anything but intense,
the character of political relations between groups is dif-
121 ficult to perceive. Thus the operation of influence at the
554 informal level, i.e. power, is difficult to comprehend. But
571 it seems absolutely necessary that politics per se be studied
in the tribal situation, and the only way that I can handle
it in the al-Qasr case is to consider leadership in the context
of an institutionalization process.

There are precedents for this approach, and these also serve to point up the importance of leadership studies in primitive societies. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xi-xxiii), referring to decision-making processes in tribal societies, was convinced that even in cases of contingencies, and seemingly "spur of the moment" group activities, careful observation would show that "they were directed by leaders who had some

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measure of recognized authority" (p. xv). Radcliffe-Brown conceived of politics as a process, and actually worked with concepts of increasing specialization in decision-making and role differentiation to bring this out (p. xxi). The structural focus of political analysis is the role: he reminds us that analytical concepts such as the "State" do not exist in the phenomenal world, that there exists only individuals who play roles and interrelate as possessors and non-possessors of authority (p. xxiii).

More recently, Pospisil (1968:201-222) has claimed that all societies necessarily possess authority roles by virtue of the fact that justice and its administration is "vested in the decision-making activity, irrespective of its informality or subtlety, of an individual or group of individuals of influence." According to Pospisil, law and conflict regulation upon which political order rests cannot be divorced from "the decision-making process of authority or group leaders" (1968:206). In his study of the Kapauku Papuans, Pospisil (1963:52-55) describes the basis of a "power" struggle between different "authorities."

In this study, I have tried to use the concepts of decision-making process, power-authority continuum, and role-structure for an analysis of Bedouin leadership. Such an approach may be better suited for a study of peasant or modern-complex societies where roles are more differentiated

121 554 571 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

554 565 Although structural differentiation along class lines does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their common interests and organize themselves"(Linton 1936:110). Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt 1957:404).

554 571 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other structures of society, constitites a system of roles. The actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

554 and political structure. This group of actors corresponds 571 to Max Weber's concept of stand, or "status group," a group set apart from the rest of society by the amount of "status honor" which its members possess. In content, "status honor" is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all of those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on social intercourse" (Gerth and Mills 1946:186-188).

In the course of daily observation in al-Qasr, one begins to understand that certain persons communicate more frequently and more easily with certain others; that the member families of this group tend to intermarry; and even that the men of this group tend to dress similarly. In each case, they visibly and socially set themselves apart from other Bedouins in al-Qasr and the surrounding area: one can identify a member of this "status group" on the streets of Marsa Matruh. They do not represent a well-structured group, least of all an association. More concisely, Weber refers to these individuals as

> A status group (which) is always somehow societalized, but is not organized into an association. Commercium, in the sense of "social intercourse," and connubium among groups are the typical characteristics of the mutual esteem among status equals; their absence signifies status differences (Gerth and Mills 1946:300).

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[577] [585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
561 [593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing,"
i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the
old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural
fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be
defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in
the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational
ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their
fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from
their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards
Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural
brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the
benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 •571 556 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 571 627 *613 [778] One most important way of accruing "status honor" in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict situations. The role of the third party represents an effective and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the office of *'aqila*. For instance, by mediating through the process of *nazaala*, the third party prevents feuds.

[114] [128] [1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 process of *nazaala*, the third party prevents feuds. In this
571 sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political
627 influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the
*[613] *'aqila*. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr, then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be designated.

[792] The central place of the third party role in the Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: *rajal khair* ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; *rajal saalih* ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; *quwaal al-khair* ("the speaker of good"); and *fa'aal al-khair* or *'amaal al-khair* ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of *rajal khair*, though some informants argued that *rajal khair* is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the *fa'aal al-khair* or *'amaal al-khair* help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 The functioning of the third party in conflict media-
571 tion is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his
627 intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring
*613 of the third party is informal by comparison with the in-
182 stitutionalized role of *'aqila*. However, the existence of the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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● 571 politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the
627 role of *'aqila*, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural
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[182] division of political duties and authority distribution.

554 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be
591 discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference
between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of *'aqila* differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles) in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following
[128] discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it
554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political
571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally
627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority
*[613] structure being divided between the *'aqila* and the third party.
What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The
[792] exception to this is the *rajal saalih* who derives his power
or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between
● 571 those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e.
627 the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered
"sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate
and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties
to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority
role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group"
impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue
of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his
status equals inside and outside the political structure.

554 This structural division of political duties for
571 dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30)
182 differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of instituional-
*613 ization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each
tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be
pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed,
and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power
of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is
554 institutionalized. The role of the third party, or the
571 mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and
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627 therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to
the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might
exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

554 •571 182 *[613] When power is institutionalized, such as it is in the role of 'aqila, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, [128] and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player.

554 571 *613 627 When we contrast the roles of 'aqila and rajal khair, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

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and to clarify the concept of political role structure for al-Qasr, we may make the useful analytical distinction between an "arbitrator" and a "mediator." George Simmel (Wolff 1950), in his discussion of the sociological significance of the third element, i.e. "the triad," notes the important difference between the "mediator" who only guides "the process of coming to terms," and the "arbitrator" who "ends up by taking sides" (1950:146-149). In the process of mediation, the termination of conflict is in the hands of the parties themselves, and there is no final authority to which one may appeal. In the process of arbitration, the _'aqila_ may, after deciding that mediation has been unsuccessful, impose his will over the wills of the litigants and appeal to the _rawaabit_ as the final authority. The mediator attempts to reduce "will" to "understanding" (Simmel 1950:148). Mediation may be considered an initial stage of most Bedouin judicial processes; thus the mediating and arbitrating attributes of political authority are not always separate, as in the role of _'aqila_. In so far as the regulation of conflict is a political mechanism for the reduction of strain, then " . . . the existence of the third element serves the perpetuation of the group" (1950:152).

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The _rajal khair_ and the "status group" in al-Qasr have much in common with Evans-Pritchard's _tut_ role in Nuer society (1940:178-181).

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> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

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Besides the 'aqila and the third party, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

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that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the other to the relatively new legal authority structure of the nation state.

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The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically influential roles is that they possess a high degree of "status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be a person of low economic status but who would belong to the "status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate. *[613] [177] The authority of the _'aqila_ and the governmental offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are legitimate only where formal litigation [627] is concerned. Beyond this, they may have influence, not legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles and operate as a _rajal khair_.

554 571 and operate as a rajal khair.

554 571 177 *613 [627] There are two primary types of political roles in al-Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal political roles have been decreed from above by the government. The traditional roles of 'aqila and "third party" represent autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of 'aqila is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of 'umda and shaikh are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office" (1946:299). [627] In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the 'aqila or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

128 **Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.**

Traditional Roles

554 571 627 The authority and role of the *'aqila* has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the *'aqila* in the form of the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil*. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a *rajal khair* when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a *rajal khair* agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a *rajal khair* can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the *rajal khair* may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

*[613] A person occupying the office of *'aqila* can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a *rajal khair*. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

554 571 627 *613 then that the _'aqila_ can increase his prestige and status beyond the limits of his formal role. When he does take the role of _rajal khair_, he does so only in conflict cases involving two lineages other than his own. Where any member of his own lineage is concerned, an incumbent _'aqila_ cannot be considered a neutral "third party" which is a prerequisite of this role. This factor constitutes a limit on the power of the _'aqila_.

One _'aqila_ explained the relationship between the _rajal khair_ and _'aqila_ roles in this way: "The two are equal. The _'aqila_ is responsible for one _bait_, but the _rajal khair_ solves any problem in any place, for any _bait_. He goes to them or they come to him. I am, for instance, responsible for the members of _Bait 'Umar_, but it is quite possible that any other _bait_ can ask for my advice in a problem. And so I go as a _rajal khair_."

In a general sense, the office of the _'aqila_ represents an ideal, while the real aspects of conflict regulation in al-Qasr center around the role of the "third party." In fact, many of the cases formally handled by the _'aqila_ afterwards undergo readjustment, as it were, by a _rajal khair_. 554 571 627 This is done by the _rajal khair's_ suggesting a "more reasonable" settlement which is agreeable to both sides. For example, in a case of conflict over water rights the following was reported: "The _'awaqil_ passed the judgement that they should pay a

554 571 627 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount." Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment *per se*, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 571 627 829 [691] *[613] The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair, or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand, the 'aqila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
627 violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
[829] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
*[613] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
[577] An informant said that

> [539] the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> [539] I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in
•571 dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of
*613 the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict
627 regulation:

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> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically
571 linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client
627 relationship permit this fact to influence their own inter-
829 pretation of the authority structure. A common view of the
*613 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves
are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles,
but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

> [539] There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

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571 The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin
627 society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one
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554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
•571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 182 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
[181] of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[556] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power
seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica:
generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and
repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the
best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This
statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said:
"The best man should be killed for this is right in the
Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man
who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The
first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 571 627 The *rajal khair*, then, is a broker in social relationships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and loyalty. This role, like that of the *'aqila*, is a secular [681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as those of the *'aqila's* are political. In this sense, they are differentiated from the role of *rajal saalih* whose sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 792 [778] The traditional role which we define as that of the *rajal saalih*, "the holy man," was probably much more important in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two *rajal saalih* who share in traditional power: the one is a resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The *rajal saalih* of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy man," is assured of status because he is an *ashraf*, one who claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a [561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi [793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is sometimes referred to as *rajal saalih kabir*, "a great holy man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared to that of the *rajal khair* in conflict regulation is a function

554 ● [571] [178] It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of the old way of life which includes belief in magic. [792] One can see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other areas of social action.

554 792 627 [695] [691] * [613] [829] Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 792 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

554 792 his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. [124] [627] In my interviews, when I asked for the name of a party, besides the _'aqila_, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the _rajal khair_, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.

554 792 627 'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the _rajal khair_, so also might he go to the _rajal salih_. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One _'aqila_ told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is *[613] ●[571] all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the _'aqila_. The _'aqila_ can solve it or he can call in other _'awaqil_ who can solve it."

[114] When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 _rajul saalih_ was more influential during the days of the
●571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
[795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations through the _zawiya_ system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today:
554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
178 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
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554 178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization process. 128 In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them. [591] [635] With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

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shaikh are administrators, not executives, in the service of the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless, under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could conceivably become seats of power.[4]

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The 'umda and shaikh are described as "elective" offices by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like the office of 'aqila. Theoretically, every man has a vote but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the 'umda and the shaikh must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the 'awaaqil (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the 'aqila in the first place).

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The two offices are not equal in prestige and status neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The office of shaikh is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the shaikh really functions as an assistant

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[635] [4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful 'umda representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the 'umda and the shaikh which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the *'umda*. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
• 571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
[178] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[177] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair. Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and control of external relations.

634 The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of *'aqila*, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of *'aqila* is functional at
[428] the *bait* level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the offices of *'umda* and *shaikh* should go to the "best men" in the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
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634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
666 the *'umda's* office, as they did of the *'aqila*, "if the son is
428 worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
•[571] Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the *'umda* and *shaikh* office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the *'aqila's* office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former *'aqila*. The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh*, in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
634 of *'umda* and *shaikh* have been "captured" by a *bait*, for
*613
666 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
428 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
578 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the honor, not of the individual, but of his *bait* and *'aiela*. And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

634 *613 no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are
666 the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not
428 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
[578] that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait
634 in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
*613 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat
666 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
428 The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who
•571 was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should
stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil
and more rajal khair.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

114 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Never-
634 theless, before I left the field I discussed the pending
666 114 election with some of my informants and members of the
634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
124 829 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
*[613] *'umda* and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
•571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of *'umda*. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an *'aqila*, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

> 571 666 Mustafa, the brother of the *'umda*, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The *'umda* told me that he was going to ask the *'awaaqil to* sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new *'umda*. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the *'umda*).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the *'umda*, the *'awaaqil* will force him to accept . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were *'umdas* before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an *'umda* while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

> 124 If the office left the family,
> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> •571 'awaagil will decide.
> 666

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the shaikh is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of 'umda. The shaikh, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the 'umda. As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the shaikh's office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the shaikh remains in the shadow of the 'umda. He never substitutes for the 'umda, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the 'umda's family; when the 'umda is absent,

634 his brother sits in his place.
554

The present shaikh is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of 'umda is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically, the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
[666] shaikh's father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
● [571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the shaikh's father is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas and that the 'umda's father was the richest man of 'Ailit Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political status quo
582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

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121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the
"great tradition" is represented in the writings and public
actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is
dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)"
(1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also
contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference
group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
121 177 the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group"
571 members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while
181 at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian
"status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the process of taking on the values of a new reference group to which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the "great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For
[771] instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance
at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior, or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
•571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other
reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when
they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type
of status consciously desired, the local authority and social
structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of
mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty,
obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection,
advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation,
representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the _'aqila_ fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
*[613] with conflict regulation. The _rajal khair_ role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The _rajal khair_ dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new
power structure based on national and political consciousness.
Traditionally, _rajal khair_-dominance was not by force but
through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

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fully organized government behind the role, the element of force may enter into the _rajal khair_ style of domination. Thus far, the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_ roles have functioned through the traditional roles of the _'aqila_ and the _rajal khair_, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

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The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people" or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

121 554 571 156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

124 554 156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected [571] in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure. [126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
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537 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
[634] 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[122] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[522] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures undergoing
178 change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, ~~then~~ the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
124
829 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
• [577] all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 159 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
554 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
177 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
178 124 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
829 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
[571] changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 796 house for *'iid al-fitr*, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
123 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

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to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a prerequisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous one for a modern leader.

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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His interest in getting on with the business of change, so to speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.

[177] [178] [562] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

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The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin

*613 602 •571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole _'aiela_ is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the Arabs. 156 159 554 829 682 But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. [778] Then the tribe of the killer asks for the _nazaala_, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's _bait_ for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
613 sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma-
571 578 jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up pop-
ular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by
another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is
more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own
Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify
the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in
their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around
their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Origi-
613 nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood-
682 money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an
increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to
avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
613 tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular
Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to
which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put
in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

682 settlement is usually made after the parties have agreed to it,
627 yet, in certain instances where one of the parties later feels that
692 the settlement was not just or that he was coerced into accepting
695 it, he may ask for a second Mi'ad during which new procedures start
in the case. In the present case, although Mahdi had originally
accepted the judgment of the awaqil, as time passed and he real-
ized that he was unable to pay the bloodmoney, he started to ques-
682 tion the feasibility of the settlement. He discussed the matter
692 with Sheikh Suliman el-Gerery from the Murabiteen tribe of Gerera,
695 a tribe whose members are feared throughout the area for the belief
554 that they have certain supernatural powers. Sheikh Suliman himself
792 is highly respected, and people believe that after his death he will
[776] become "vali" or a saint. After hearing Mahdi's complaint, Sheikh
Suliman told him that the settlement was unjust and told him that he
would do something about it. The following Thursday, Sheikh Suliman
called on Mahdi and asked him to bring his donkey and follow him.
They rode to a small desert town called Bahig where the local market
613 is held every Thursday. On market day, the awaqil of various tribal
517 segments usually gather in front of the general store in the town
571 drinking tea and chatting until their sons or the younger members
443 576 of their families sell the sheep and buy the necessary items. Every-
one passing by the gathering is expected to greet the gathering, get-
ting off his donkey as a sign of respect to the prominent people.
[689] Failure to greet a fellow tribesman is considered a serious offense
liable to a fine of more than L. 50 and ten goats in certain cases.
[673] It is considered a very serious crime. One informant once told me,
000

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
578 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population
are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describ-
571 ing the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders[4]. Failure to abide by
[589] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
[574] sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usu-
571 ally dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where. The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
627 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 [illegible] the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[574] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties involved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[589] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members
627 182 who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is
681 reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of
554 that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This
creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals
who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected
● 571 578 in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial
627 reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases
182 are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the in-
571 formality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settle-
627 182 ment informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

The
Turkish Administration was centred in the towns but operated, 632
as will be explained later, through the contacts of its local 648*
officials, who were generally Arabs of the country, with the lead- 571
ing tribal Shaikhs, with whom they made friends. These officials 369
were townsmen or sons of Bedouin who had received an urban
education and they acted as links between the citizen communities and the Bedouin. Through Bedouin relations with
town merchants and officials what was happening in the world
outside Cyrenaica percolated to the most distant tents. Another 795*
channel of political and cultural infiltration was the network of 571
Sanusiya lodges. The Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge at Banghazi 648*
was regarded as the ambassador of the head of the Order to the 177
Governor of Cyrenaica and he was chosen for qualities which 632
fitted him for this role. He was consulted by the Governor on 793
matters in which the tribes were involved, and through him 369
and the Brothers of the lodges of the towns news of the outside
world reached the Head of the Order in the distant oasis of
Kufra and the Heads of the local lodges, whose relations with
the Bedouin in their localities were intimate. Thus, as will be
seen, the Bedouin had a general idea of what the revolution of
the 'Young Turks' meant and were aware of the impending crisis
long before the Italian attack on their country was delivered.
But though maintaining communications with the towns, 632
neither the tribal Shaikhs nor the Sanusiya allowed themselves 571
to be subordinated to them or identified themselves with urban 795
interests. The Bedouin Shaikh did not, like the Syrian landowner, feel any need to have a town house, and the Sanusiya 369
ever remained a country and Bedouin Order and directed its
affairs from the desert.

Town and country kept apart, with the towns dependent on 632
the country and not the country on the towns, because there 369
was in Cyrenaica no client peasantry bound by debt, need of 565
protection, and trade monopoly to the towns. The Bedouin
did not settle on the land where they would be an easy prey to
the usurer, overseer, and tax collector. Those who were defeated [167]
in the great tribal wars of the past and in the inter-tribal and
inter-sectional fighting of more recent times migrated to Egypt
and settled there as *fallahin*, and not in Cyrenaica. In Cyrenaica 565
there is not the spur of adverse climatic conditions or the lash 167
of land shortage to drive them to depart from their ancient

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some
of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the
territories to which they are attached are correspondingly
smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of
section, and the precise amount of water available in the local
wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups
increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show
a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter
rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity
of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant
alteration of any one of these components must mean
that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be
made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened
by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young
boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and
the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571] ●
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at
the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies
in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular
section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are
being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements
become numerous, or when the water supply, for various
reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out.
Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will
be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary
section will have been born. No matter which of the processes
involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—
both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section,
without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are considered
[423] to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—
at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they
are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they
are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients
are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large
groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a
genealogical and territorial organization like those of the freeborn,
and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the
country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and
enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their
characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
619 tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
571 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
621 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
613 number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular 619
section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination 613
of small groups of people each group having specific relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes 619
no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, [682]
and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached
for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, 166
the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences 682
ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by 571
the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of 829
this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by 128
homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the
Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show [613]
that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships
nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the 121
comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does com- 613
plexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a 571
sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to
give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For
sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoreti-
cal presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article [128]
some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is [578]

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[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. 12 [114] ← My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
● 571 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[571] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration
of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary
311 sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

621 613 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
•571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in
direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between
collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in
the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent,
partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more
self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social
relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the
territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section.
Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year
some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these
differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade
relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory
which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that
they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed ' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
● 571 authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the
lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting
as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, ' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plenti-
[621] ful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize
other tribal groups.

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
726 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
● 571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
[628] in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly con- 121
cerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of 613
the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made 571
it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered 628
their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up
of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it
was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It 121
follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrena- 613
ica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what 114
I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that
additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide
an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in
error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are intro-
duced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social
relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social [829]
life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use
which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been
elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal
dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as
Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned 121
as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small 613
groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely 571
as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it per- 578
sists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a
violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition
for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for
groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations
and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant
groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition,
the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not
depart from the framework set by informants—the 121
agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and
fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and 613
so on is explained by informants in different lan- 114
guages as adequately as it is explained by social
anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint 171
is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
• [577] interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
[578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding
233 tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315] tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his good-will, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the 585
father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. 593
Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom
must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side
"as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional
ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities,
but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and
pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing
has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation [592]
of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional
tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To 593
mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between 264
father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son 571
does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. 182
The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one
bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which
Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of
its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong
bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the
settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement,
and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a [574]
meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow
against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3]
as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its 571
roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very 231
vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of 264
their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this 182
mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a
meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock [574]
or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often [186]
given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which
the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A
slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence,* which establishes this bond

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[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from [415]
south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is [439]
unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying
a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his [123]
bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites.* 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927. [113]

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so
until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of [574]
anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I [609]
have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering
any specific identity.

•571 between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute
231 their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

264 The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been
182 doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else
593 at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at mar-
585 riage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new
182 tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple
retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's
[425] tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before.
[556] In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent ap-
pearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among
them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of
an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things re-
main "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes
have been initiated.

852 *Rites de passage* are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is
881 ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage
764 and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined
stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's
858 shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched
789 to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed
and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he
857 grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow
233 the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and
883 responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he
233 may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the
[431] stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These
[411] changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes
[484] during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are
[885] concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for
852 circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible.
88 Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of
796 relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is
[771] true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include
all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in
[554] elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are
not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a
[613] lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences
[554] of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly cap-
[602] tured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically
to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

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[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.[11] Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal. [834] [342] [264] 264 574 571 [602]

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame. 594 183 [462] [857] [883] [462] [561] [554] [556]

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and 121 183 594 [621]

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[11] This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

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

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592
574 since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly
231 dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

621 The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was
592 the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a
•571 few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who
[578] robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from
[233] the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to
justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his
sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he
would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for
short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several
weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow
the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent
A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen
around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to
[574] enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better than would have been possible otherwise. 621 592 571

[574] The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

621 613 592 571 Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

621 592 604 578 [582] [428] [583] The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach," (meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. [571] His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[428] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
[593] shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
[233] camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
[571] A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[613] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
[602] fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
571 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
571 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.[14]

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Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

574 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
231 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably

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43 [14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
[556] his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the occupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences. 621 574 231 262 431 [556]

Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them.[1] Perhaps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours. 621 613 602

Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes 621 571 554

621 were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated,
• 571 two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon
[554] be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was
a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps
show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain
general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with
[128] equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations,
which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on
the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is
important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute
importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

113

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